The recent literature dealing with Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has focused on technological as well as traditional factors as determinants of the attractive capabilities. More precisely, in addition to market size, corporate tax rates, labour costs and the privatisation process, variables such as the skilled labour ratio and the relative stocks of patents granted to the host country, were shown to play a significant role in the statistical analysis. This finding could represent the starting point of a technological transfer process that could improve the growth performances of the transition economies. Nevertheless, in order to boost economic growth, strong linkages between multinationals and host economies should emerge after FDI localisation. Very often these linkages rely on suitable levels of R&D activities and human capital that complement each other. Therefore the development of endogenous technological abilities (e.g. increasing stock of patent applications), also depends on the sectoral coherence between the localisation of the R&D activities and the human capital concentration. Starting from these considerations and using the Eurostat data, this paper explores, both theoretically and empirically, the relationships between FDI, R&D, human capital, numbers of innovations, number of patent applications and productivity, in the CEE countries. In particular, a "coherence" between sectoral FDI, R&D expenditure and a higher skilled labour ratio, is expected to favour the innovation process and this complementarity is expected to be dependent on the technological intensity of production. Our empirical results provide first evidence of the variety of the realisation of this complementarity and that the compatibility of our interpretative scheme with the economic facts cannot be excluded, especially with respect to certain groups of countries and specific sectors.
Introduction
The role of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in favouring the transition of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries towards a market-based economy has been largely debated in recent economic literature. Although some analyses have highlighted some uncertain and uneven effects of foreign capital inflows (e.g. Pavlinek 2000 Pavlinek , 2002 Pavlinek , 2004 Damijan et al. 2003; Pavlinek and Smith, 1998, Szanyi, 2000) most of the positions have stressed their potential in the process of industrial modernisation, productivity improvement, increased quality and competitiveness of products and sale performances due to organisational restructuring, technological transfer, employee training, inflow of management practices and renovation of productive and organisational strategies (e.g. among many others, Sharp and Barz 1997; Hamar 1999; Lankes and Stern 1997; Estrin et al. 2000) . Within this framework, FDI, as a channel for technology transfer, is one of the major concerns of scholars due to its centrality for growth dynamics. In this paper we hypothesise a possible interpretative framework within which the complementarity between different types of innovative inputs (some of them FDI-induced), taking into account the role of sector-specificity due to different technology intensities, plays a key role. We make this possible scheme of interpretation explicit in the section 2, where it is placed within the framework of the most relevant literature. In the second part of the paper we try to translate our interpretative outline into empirical evidence for the CEE countries, using the western European countries and some meaningful aggregates of countries as benchmarks. The comparative approach can help to provide eventual evidence of the usefulness of our scheme in transition versus market-based economies. We first identify the relevant indicators (section 3.1.) and then provide some descriptive statistics about their levels and relationships (section 3.2). In section 4
we extend our explorative analysis in order to provide evidence of the compatibility of our interpretative pattern with the empirical facts. In particular, we use a multivariate statistical technique (cluster analysis) to highlight significant sector-specific classifications of countries according to different levels and characteristics of technological input and output and assess the role of FDI. In the final section 5 we summarize the main findings of our research and briefly discuss the major policy implications.
An Heuristic Scheme of Interpretation
It has been noted that FDI play a singular role in the international diffusion of technology.
Different from formal transactions, in which foreign firms can sell machinery and equipment, technical and managerial services directly to outsiders, with FDI, multinational enterprises choose to retain the control and ownership of their proprietary technology within the corporation.
However, voluntarily or involuntarily FDI become an informal channel for technology transfer (Blomstrom and Kokko 1997) . Indeed, one of the main reasons for policy interventions aimed at and Pennings 2005; Salis 2005) . Unfortunately, in the empirical analysis of the national-level aggregated data, it is impossible to impose this device. However we can apply some findings of endogenous growth theory in order to explore if FDI are enforcing a real technological transfer in the host countries and if it improves their overall productivity levels and growth rates over the long period.
As discussed above, there are important relationships between FDI and some innovative inputs such as R&D expenditure or human capital. Some aspects of endogenous growth theory emphasize that complementarity between R&D and human capital plays a crucial role, in obtaining innovative output (patents, overall innovations), higher productivity levels and growth rates. Redding (1996) examined a model where multiple growth equilibrium is possible. In high-growth equilibrium, workers expect the firm to invest in R&D, and the resultant increase in their expected wage increases their incentive to invest in human capital (a higher level of education and training).
In turn, a larger expected stock of human capital raises the expected returns for investing in R&D compared to those who continue to use an existing technology, and hence the entrepreneur is encouraged to invest in R&D. Young (1993 Young ( , 1992 Young ( , 1991 , according to the history of technical change suggestions, combined a model of invention, in which technical change is the outcome of costly and deliberative research aimed at developing new technologies, with a learning-by-doing model, in which technical change is the serendipitous by-product of experience gained during the production of goods. The idea underlying this theoretical work is that, in the absence of introducing new technical processes, it is unlikely that learning-by-doing can be sustained, being that the amount of knowledge that must be serendipitously acquired from experience in productive activity is finite in any given environment. On the other hand, most new technologies are, at the beginning, markedly inferior (in terms of immediate productivity gains) to the older technologies that they are trying to replace. Incremental improvements over time, however, allow new technologies to ultimately overcome older production systems across a wide variety of activities.
So, according to this view, the opportunity to take advantage of these knowledge inflows depends on the possibility of activating a virtuous knowledge-creating spiral in which tacit and explicit (codified) knowledge is continuously being combined and remixed (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) .
In our exploration, we have simply tried to highlight some of the first empirical evidence of this interpretative framework (see Figure A1 in Appendix). In particular, we have tried to determine if there is any correspondence between forms of the afore-said complementarity (in which FDI plays a key role) and the existence of innovative outputs, such as patents or number of overall innovations, and levels of productivity in the host countries. One innovative aspect of our research is that the analyses were carried out using a sectoral breakdown based on the different technological intensities of the economic activities, based on the hypothesis that this is useful for identifying the technological environment where complementarity could emerge. If FDI trigger this complementarity and if it corresponds to innovative outputs or productivity levels then it is possible that a technological transfer arises and our interpretative framework would not be inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
In the next sections we will analyse the main comparative evidence and then explore the relationships between FDI, innovative inputs, innovative outputs and productivity levels, by means of correlation and multivariate analysis, in order to (i) highlight differences and similarities between the European economies (and groups of countries) and (ii) determine if the empirical results support the above-suggested theoretical framework.
A First Empirical Investigation
In this section we present the main characteristics of the data and variables used and then we discuss the results of the comparative and correlation analyses.
Data and Variables
All the indicators used in the analysis are derived from the Eurostat database. One of the reasons why we cannot carry out a dynamic analysis is the time mismatch between the available data. Many proxies of innovative input and output are derived from surveys carried out in different periods. In order to render our analysis more robust, we preferred to use for all the variables the average over the period 2000-2002 (2002 is the most recent year available for most of the data) rather then using a single year value. The data referring to Continuous Vocational Training, LifeLong Learning (LLL) and innovative firms however refer to the most recent year of the corresponding survey. Our data refer to the E-25 countries plus Romania and Bulgaria. The latter, together with the CEE-8 (the eight new eastern EU members), make up the CEE-10 aggregate. At the end of each table we also provide, for comparative purposes, the average value of the variables with reference to the following sets: the EU-25, EU-15 (EU members before May 2004), EMU-12 (European Monetary Union Members), CEE-10 and CEE-8.
In order to study the relationships between FDI, innovative input and innovative output of host countries, we have only taken into account inward FDI 1 , that is, the investment by foreigners in enterprises resident in the reporting economy, standardised from its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While both stocks and flows are reported for the national economies as a whole, for the sectoral breakdown that is crucial in our analyses, we considered inward FDI stocks, in order to take into account the overall position of foreign capital within each sector (see Table 1 for the composition of the four sectors considered).
The R&D expenditure intensity (R&D expenditure out of GDP) is the most classical innovative input; in the industrial context it is also the codified form of knowledge (Young 1993) .
The R&D results could be embodied in patents, product or process innovations, blueprints, books, etc. Starting with Griliches (1979) , a new theoretical and empirical field of economic research has attempted to specify and estimate a knowledge production function and the R&D expenditure is the main factor of this production function (Jaffe 1989; Jaffe et al. 1993; Acs et al. 1992 Acs et al. , 1994 Acs et al. , 2002 Feldman 1994) . In order to explicitly show the importance of this indicator at a sectoral level, we also considered the R&D personnel by sectors (standardised on the country population).
It is an indicator that is highly correlated to R&D expenditure (Griliches 1979) a factor that could not be used due to the lack of data for the sectoral breakdown.
Of course R&D activities are not the only innovative input. The sectoral specialisation, measured by the employment data using the classical Balassa index, is adopted as a proxy of learning-by-doing and tacit knowledge accumulated within labour force (Serrano et al. 2004; Paci and Usai 2000) . A relevant number of workers belonging to the same industry, even if collocated within the whole country level of the economy, could indeed reflect important sectoral knowledge spillovers and could also be a sign that significant experience had been accumulated in the economic specialisation.
Moreover, the skill formation within firms could be the result of a combined effect of formal training processes and learning-by-doing (Freeman 1998) . So, as an indicator of Continuing
Vocational Training (CVT) we chose the number of employees participating in CVT courses out of the total number of employees (Eurostat database). CVT is also considered to be an important condition for good performance of FDI in some CEE countries (Radosevich and Rozeich 2005).
As mentioned in the previous section, there are other proxies of human capital that are usually used in the literature as innovative input and are often considered complement to R&D activities (Redding 1996) . In our case we chose the traditional higher education indicators: (i) population aged 15 and over with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary levels of education and (ii) population aged 15 and over with tertiary education (ISCED 1997 classification) .
The data were of course standardised out of the total population. At the same time, we selected a Life-Long Learning (LLL) indicator, that is, the participation of adults aged 25-64 in all learning activities undertaken throughout life (number of participants out of the total population), in order to improve knowledge, skills and competence. LLL was deemed to be an important indicator for monitoring human capital evolution in an era of rapid technological change (EU 2000) .
Regarding innovative outputs, we considered patents (per million inhabitants) and the percentage of innovative enterprises out of the total number of firms. The number of patent applications is the most traditional indicator for describing successful innovative activities (Griliches 1990 ). It is well-known that this measure is controversial, even though it is widely used. The main problems associated with its application regard the sectoral bias (propensity of patents to depend upon the different technological regimes that characterise the industries) and the institutional bias (very often the patent application trend is closely related to specific national laws and norms). We attempt to overcome the second problem by using patent applications presented to the European Patent Office (EPO). In addition, Eurostat provides these data arranged according to the International Patent Classification (IPC) and not according to economic activities. For this reason we were able to carry out the adopted sectoral breakdown (Table 1) , therefore a second-best solution was adopted in which the number of groups was reduced (hi-tech sectors and low-tech sectors). The sectoral bias problem involves an unsatisfactory representation of innovative outputs provided by patents. Several authors have attempted to integrate this measure with innovation counts (Acs et al. 1992 (Acs et al. , 1994 (Acs et al. , 2002 Feldman 1994) . The latter is a direct indicator that relies on the declaration of innovative activities. It includes not only drastic or important innovations that are worthy of patent application, but are also the small improvements in products or production processes that stem from informal innovative activities. In our analysis, the percentage of enterprises with innovation activities is also considered in the analysis. This information was obtained from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for the period 1998-2000, and concerns all the enterprises that introduced new or significantly improved products (goods or services) onto the market or enterprises that implemented new or significantly improved processes.
The productivity levels are simply arranged according to the country's GDP per worker. We calculated the indicator for the whole economy and for the manufacturing sector (since it was not possible to do it at the sectoral level). The very high correlation between the two indicators allowed us to opt for the general one due to the completeness of data for the whole set of countries considered.
So, given the availability of the data, we were able to refer the following variables to the adopted sectoral breakdown: FDI stocks, sectoral specialisation and R&D personnel; as for the patent data, we were able to distinguish two sectors (high and low tech); and finally it was possible to limit the CVT indicator to the manufacturing sector.
The manufacturing economic activities are re-classified into four macro-sectors: High Tech Sectors (HTS), Medium High-Tech Sectors (MHTS), Medium Low-Tech Sectors (MLTS) and Low
Tech-Sectors (LTS) ( Table 1 ).
The afore-mentioned innovative inputs are sensitive to technological regimes, therefore it is important to verify in which technological macro-sectors the relationships that signal the existence of complementarity occur. For example, we do not expect a steady complementarity between R&D and learning-by-doing in the LTS or MLTS sectors, given that it is quite normal to find very few R&D activities in these contexts. In contrast, it is more plausible to expect FDI triggering the same complementarity in the HT or MHT sectors. 
Comparative Evidence and Correlation Analysis
Considering the above-mentioned variables, we present the main comparative evidence for the European countries and aggregations, with particular attention given to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and we carried out a correlation analysis, in order to quantify the existing differences and to investigate some possible relationships and complementarities.
As shown in Table 1 show that geographical proximity influences the investment source, i.e. the share of FDI coming from the EU-15 partners is notable and it is similar in the EU and CEE aggregations (and countries).
As is well-known, the CEE-10 countries are characterised by various levels of progress in transition that can be (roughly) measured by a synthetic index of transition. A clear positive correlation between overall progress in transition and inward FDI emerged (Figure 1 ). However, if
we consider the FDI in the manufacturing sector, distinguished by technological intensity, the relationship is much more complex (Table A11 and Figure A2 in Appendix). The picture of inward FDI macro-sectoral localisation (with respect to GDP), concerning only stocks, is quite a composite (Table A1 in Considering the inward FDI stock (as per cent of GDP) in the manufacturing sub-sectors, reclassified according to technological intensity, a clearer dichotomy emerges (Table 3 ). In a situation of significant national differences, most inward FDI stocks of the CEE countries have occurred in low-tech or medium low-tech industries, with the exception of the Czech Republic (4.8% of GDP resulted in MHTS vs 3.8% in LTS). In the EU-15 countries again with remarked national differences, the opposite seems to hold. As for the CEE countries, the prevalence of FDI stocks for the low-tech sectors is coherent with the specific industrial specialisation model of those countries characterised by lower labour costs compared to the EU-15 economies. As for R&D expenditure (Table A3 in Appendix), the intensity (as per cent of GDP) in the ten CEE countries is less than half that of the EU-15 value (0.76% against 1.95%). Things change little if we consider the EMU-12 and CEE-8 aggregations. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic We also found a sort of correspondence/coherence between the situation of the CEE countries represented in the previous evidence and the degree of specialisation. Within this context, the highest level of industrial specialisation, expressed in employed terms, were found in the low-tech and medium-low-tech sectors (Table 5 ). Of course, there are the usual exceptions;
the Czech Republic (1.63) and Slovenia (1.71) also show a good specialisation level in mediumhigh-tech industries. Hungary (1.78) had the highest specialisation in the high tech manufacturing sectors. The degrees of specialisation are significantly different between the western and eastern countries. Considering the continuous vocational training (CVT) in manufacturing sectors, a dichotomy seems to increase between the Czech Republic and Slovenia on the one hand, and the rest of the examined CEE countries, on the other (Table A4 in Appendix). The percentages of employees participating in CVT courses in the Czech Republic (42%), and Slovenia (37%) surpass both the CEE-10 and EU-15 averages. The major efforts made to introduce innovative input such as R&D expenditure and researchers, compared to the other CEE countries, probably need a complement in employee training, in order to upgrade capabilities and manage new production processes.
Moreover, the same two countries seem to substitute the lower levels of higher education (Czech Republic 7.7 %; Slovenia 9.6%), that remain under the CEE-10 average (10.9%) and the EU-15 average (13.5%), with life-long learning (3.0 participants per 100,000 inhabitants in the Czech Republic, 4.3 in Slovenia); this is higher than the CEE-10 value (Tables A5 and A4 in Appendix).
Innovative output indicated by patents are unequally distributed between the EU-15 and CEE-10, with the weak technological capabilities of the latter being highlighted (Table 6 ). The distance between the two groups of countries becomes larger in the case of high-tech patents. As far as single countries are concerned, the usual exception holds: total patent applications, standardised by population, are significantly higher than the CEE-10 average (9.7) in the Czech Republic (11.9) and Slovenia (33.9). Hungary (19.1) also has a good performance. In the context of transition economies, where the innovative enterprise density (innovative enterprises per 10.000
inhabitants) is about half of the EU-15 value, the Czech Republic exceeds the CEE-10 average and approaches the EU-15 value. The value in Estonia (Table 7) is particularly high. In order to investigate some probable complementary or substitution relationships, we carried out a correlation analysis (Tables A7-A10 in Appendix) for all the European countries 2 , using all the considered variables, focusing on the differences between low tech sectors (LTS), medium low tech sectors (MLTS), medium high tech sectors (MHTS) and high tech sectors (HTS).
The correlation matrix for the LTS highlighted the absence of any significant correlation between FDI sectoral localisation and all the other variables. We found a negative correlation between R&D efforts and sectoral specialisation (-0.598) which indicates that the two innovative inputs seem to be substitutes rather than complement. It is important to note that significant positive correlations can be observed for life-long learning (LLL) and continuous vocational training (CVT) with R&D efforts, for both the expenditure and personnel terms. At the same time, a positive correlation emerges between LLL, CVT, and R&D on the one hand, and patents and productivity levels, on the other. There was no significant correlation, between the innovative input mentioned above and the other innovative output used in the analysis, that is, the percentage of innovative enterprises. The low-tech sectors using patents, probably need R&D along with employee training, rather than learning-by-doing inside the firm. Continuous re-organization of production processes, that is the result of steady R&D expenditure and leads to patent applications, could justify the need for training that would allow a more drastic adaptation of the workers. Anyway, the innovative activities outlined above do not rely on FDI. If we consider the correlation matrix for MLTS, the situation is very similar to that of LTS.
In the MHTS industries, significant and positive correlations emerge between FDI and R&D expenditure intensity (0.583) on the one hand and FDI and CVT (0.627) on the other hand.
Moreover, both R&D and CVT are positively correlated with patents (0.850 and 0.652 respectively) and productivity levels (0.624 and 0.707 respectively). It seems that complementarity, between R&D and vocational training, with positive effects on innovative activities, holds in this context.
The discriminative difference in this case is due to the role played by FDI in sustaining that complementarity.
The results presented in the correlation matrix for high-tech industries (HTS) depict a very singular case. The correlation matrix reflects a sort of dichotomy represented by a significant and positive correlation (0.645) between FDI and the specialisation level on the one hand, and the usual positive relations among R&D, vocational training, patents and productivity levels, on the other. So, in this context innovative activities do not rely on FDI; rather, they seem to be implemented by internal R&D and training efforts. Instead, foreign enterprises only invest where there are high capability levels in the labour force, generated by specialisation and learning-bydoing, that shape the industry.
The above-cited correlation results for the European countries highlight the different and complex relationships (role of FDI, complementarity or substitution between innovative inputs, etc.) according to the four technological manufacturing intensity macro-sectors, but these did not allow us to determine if some groups of countries have similar characteristics in the considered variables.
The Position of the CEE Countries within the European Picture: a Cluster Analysis
In this section we provide a further analysis of the variables considered, through the use of multivariate statistical techniques. Our main objective is to discuss the position of the CEE countries within a more general framework of the whole European area. The choice of cluster analysis, aimed at obtaining groups of similar countries with respect to the afore-said characteristics, is also expected to provide evidence of the existence / non-existence of situations and conditions supporting the interpretative framework discussed in section 2. In this section we first explain the methodology used and then present the most relevant outcomes obtained.
Objectives and Methodology
Through the use of a relatively large amount of information, the various methods of cluster analysis allow us to draw relevant alternative profiles of the phenomena under investigation, which correspond to clusters of the most similar observations. Each group is characterised by a combination of the different levels of the variables chosen to describe the phenomena. For this study, we expect that by putting together information about FDI and the sets of the other potential innovative inputs and of the innovative outputs we will obtain some insights about the alternative ways in which the different factors mix in various socio-economic and institutional (country level) contexts. One aspect that can be attached a-priori to this analysis is associated with the possibility of carrying out diversified analyses according to different technology intensities of the sectors considered, and to highlight if the sector-specific information plays a relevant role in characterising how the different levels of the chosen variables mix. Of course the aim of our research is purely explorative and we do not intend to verify the existence of robust cause-effect relationships. Nonetheless, the results could highlight the co-existence of economic conditions, more or less consistent with our interpretative framework, that could help characterize the phenomena under consideration or to render research hypotheses explicit that could be tested in further investigations.
Considering the features of cluster analysis, the large set of variables considered in the previous section and the high level of correlation suggest that the number of indicators be limited to those that provide the least redundant information. The correlation analyses (Table A7-A10 in Appendix) allowed the so-called "active variables" to be identified. Given the relatively large number of missing values of the correlated variables, the one that provided the most complete information about the 27 countries (and among the CEE-10) was maintained. Given that the strength of the correlation among the initial set of variables changed across the four technology intensity sectors, the set of "active variables" is different in the implementations of the four (one for each sector) cluster analyses. Obviously, once the outcomes of the analyses are considered satisfactory (in terms of clusters identification), the "non-active variables" can be reintroduced in order to enrich the characterisation of the groups.
Considering the characteristics of the database (in particular, the existence of some missing values) and taking into account the clustering options available in the SPSS package, we decided to use the k-means method, which allows cluster analyses to be performed even when some variables have missing values 3 . Within our interpretative and descriptive scheme, and given the importance of the FDI variable (FDI in the sector / GDP), the countries with missing values for this indicator were excluded. This is the reason why the number of observations differs in the four sector-specific cluster analyses.
Prior to implementing the analyses, each variable was standardised on the average of the available EU-25 countries. This simple standardisation, which was necessary in order to perform the cluster analysis, also allowed the characters of the cluster to be compared directly to the EU-25 benchmark (for each variable the EU-25 average equals 1).
Results
Tables 8-11 depict the clustering outcomes for each technology-intensity sector that appeared to be the most relevant based on the information supplied and that seemed to provide the best compromise between the number of groups and their level of diversification. For all four implementations of the cluster analysis, the most interesting repartition was that divided into six clusters. These repartitions were chosen for the discussion 4 . The initial set of variables is the same as that considered in the previous correlation analyses; some variables are again specific to the four sectors (FDI , R&D_POP and SPEC) and the IPC variable is diversified into Low-and HighTech Sectors (so LTS_IPC is used for the analyses of LTS and MLTS, while HTS_IPC is used for the remaining two).
The composition of the clusters with reference to the Low Technology Sector (LTS), where it was possible to consider 20 (of which 7 CEE) out of 27 countries, is presented in Table 8 . The Table also contains the average of the clusters (EU-25 countries average = 1) and a measure of similarity among the clusters (the lower the distance between the cluster centres, the greater the similarity).
In the LTS, all of the Central and Eastern European countries included in the analysis are grouped into one cluster (the cluster remains the same even if the number of groups is increased to 7 and 8 in further implementation of the analysis). It is characterised by above-average levels of FDI, relevant specialisation in low-tech sectors and relatively high levels of only intermediate education (the higher education is nearly average). These features are accompanied by very low levels of R&D (both sector-and non-sector-specific), life-long learning and continuous vocational training. On the side of innovative output performance, we observe very weak levels of patents, as well as a poor productivity performance, while the share of innovative enterprises is very close to the reference threshold (average of the European countries). So, in the case of LTS, the significant FDI inflows into the CEE countries seems to be accompanied by a notable presence of contextual rather that formal knowledge inflows, with poor formal innovation production and weak productivity; and the former can be partly considered a consequence of the specialisation pattern.
It should be noted that the group 5 is the most similar to cluster 1; group 5 is made-up of Greece and Portugal, two of the weakest economies in Western Europe. Cluster 4 (The Netherlands) seems to play the role of the counterpart to cluster 1, since here the high levels of FDI are coupled with high levels of codified knowledge inflows and the presence of these innovative inputs is compatible with an intense innovative formal output and productivity performance. To some extent this situation could also be referred to the case of Ireland (cluster 6), while cluster 3 suggests that the good innovative performance could depend on other factors that were not considered and cluster 2 seems to indicate that relevant formal innovative activity could take place independent of FDI but relying on domestic investment and production of formal knowledge. Finally, it is interesting to underline that all the clusters are characterised alternatively by high levels of R&D or specialisation, but these factors cannot be considered as substitutes (codified vs. tacit knowledge)
in the process of innovation production or productivity performance, since the highest levels of these indicators are only associated with formalised knowledge inflows.
In order to underline the main differences between the LT and HT sectors, we now consider the clustering results carried out on the HTS set of variables; later, we will comment on the outcomes for the sectors of intermediate levels of technology intensity (MLT and MHLT).
As for the high-tech sector, the clusters composition immediately provides evidence of marked differences compared to the situation of the low-tech sectors. Apart from The Netherlands and Ireland that confirm their strong specificity (very high levels of FDI coupled with strong innovative and productive performance, accompanied by high levels of formal knowledge and also specialisation with regards to Ireland) and from the second cluster (that highlights again the similarity between Denmark, Finland and the UK), it should be noted that the CEE countries are scattered among three different groups. This, first of all, suggests that the situation of the CEE countries in the HT sector is less homogeneous than in the LTS; furthermore, some CEE countries are more similar to some of the western countries. While the three Baltic countries and Bulgaria are set apart from the rest of the countries with very low levels of both potential innovative input (including FDI) and output, this is not the case for the Czech Republic that is associated with Germany and Austria. These countries have above-average intensive knowledge flows of various kinds that seem to be compatible with the near-average innovative and productivity performance.
To some extent this group could be considered a soft version of the two extreme punctiform situations represented by The Netherlands and Ireland. This group seems to provide (together with these two other groups) a possible support to the virtuous circle proposed in section 2 as a possible interpretative option. Moreover these results would suggest that the various forms of knowledge creation (stemming from R&D or specialisation patterns) in the HT sectors could be complementary inputs, rather than substitutes, in innovative and productivity performance. Our outcomes also suggest that the suitability of our interpretative framework cannot be excluded in the HT sectors, while this is not the case for the low-tech sectors, where a more distinct pure localisation strategy of cost minimisation with weaker development spillovers could be hypothesised. Finally, Poland and Slovakia are classified in cluster five, together with France, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece. In this cluster all the variables show remarkably lower than average levels of performance; this situation is quite similar to that of cluster 4. The outcomes recorded for the Medium-Low Tech Sector (MLTS) again suggest a clear diversification between the CEE countries and the remaining western countries. However, it is interesting to note that the CEE countries are divided into two separate groups (1 and 4); the two clusters have very similar levels of innovative output but quite different endowments in terms of human capital (of higher level in cluster 4), specialisation and R&D activities (more relevant in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria), with the major difference being the capacity to attract FDI.
These outcomes would, to some extent, confirm those obtained for the LTS: in the lowest technology intensive sectors, even when the conditions for innovation and productivity growth are present (including the presence of FDI) in the CEE countries, they do not necessarily become concrete and evolve into growth potential, but rather seem to remain a simple localisation factor.
The configurations of the remaining clusters confirm (i) the specificity of Denmark, Finland and the UK, again grouped together in cluster 3 (where the good innovative and productivity performance is due to a high endowment of human capital and significant levels of R&D activity, both general and sector specific); and (ii) that The Netherlands is a distinctive case where the mix of high FDI, R&D and human capital is compatible with strong innovative performance. Group 6 suggests that, different from the case of LTS, complementarity could exist between different types of knowledge, even in the absence of significant foreign investment inflows. The position of Italy and Portugal (cluster 3) suggests instead that high specialisation is compatible with above-average productivity but alone it is not sufficient to foster formal innovation production. The fourth cluster analysis (with reference to the Medium-High Tech Sector) confirms the specificity of The Netherlands (cluster 6), Denmark, Finland and the UK (group 2), highlights the outstanding performance of Sweden (where the synergy hypothesised in our interpretative framework seems very possible), and reiterates how good innovative and productive performances can be obtained in the absence of foreign capital inflows by relying on domestic factors of tacit and codified knowledge (cluster 3 of Germany, France and Austria).
Cluster 5 groups all of the CEE countries except the Czech Republic (increasing the number of clusters again does not split the group), together with some very low performers of Western Europe. It seems to provide further evidence (in negative terms) of the proposed interpretative framework. Interestingly, the Czech Republic is detached from the rest of the CEE countries, with well-above-average levels of foreign capital endowment, specialisation and human capital; these factors however do not guarantee significantly higher innovative and productive performances with respect to group 5. 
Summary and Final Remarks
Starting from a simple theoretical framework (section 2) and using Eurostat data (Section 3.1.), the paper explores the relationships between FDI, R&D, human capital, number of innovations, number of patent applications and productivity in the European countries (EU-25 plus Romania and Bulgaria), with particular attention given to the CEE countries and considering the EU aggregations as benchmark.
In particular, an interpretative framework highlighted the main (complex) relationships, with attention given to a possible complementarity between different types of innovative inputs (some of them FDI-induced) and taking into account the crucial role of sector-specificity due to different technology intensities. We argue that education and R&D activities are not the only innovative input. Sectoral specialisation, measured by the classical Balassa index using employment data, was used as a proxy of learning-by-doing and tacit knowledge accumulated within the labour force. Moreover, we took into account that the skill formation within firms could be the result of a combined effect of formal training processes (CVT) and learning-by-doing.
In sections 3 and 4 we discussed the comparative differences between the western and the eastern European countries and, in particular, we explored if there was any evidence of a correspondence between forms of the afore-said complemetarity (in which FDI plays a key role) and the existence of innovative outputs, such as patents or number of overall innovations, and levels of productivity in the host countries. One innovative aspect of our research was to carry out the analyses using a sectoral breakdown according to different technological intensities of economic activities, under the hypothesis that this is useful for identifying the technological environment where complementarity could emerge.
Focusing on the CEE countries, the comparative analyses presented in the first part of Republic and Slovenia and in the rest of the CEE countries; the major efforts made by the two countries to introduce innovative input such as R&D expenditure and researchers, compared to the other CEE countries, probably need a complement in employee training, in order to upgrade the capabilities and manage new production processes; moreover, these two countries seem to substitute the lower levels of higher education, that are below the CEE-10 and EU-15 averages, with life-long learning that is higher the than CEE-10 value; (ix) remarkable differences between the CEE-10 and EU-15 countries in patent applications, especially in the high tech sectors, with the usual exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia accompanied by Hungary; and (x) an innovative enterprise density value in the CEE countries that was nearly half that of the EU-15, with Estonia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania showing higher values.
In order to investigate some probable complementarity or substitution relationships, we carried out a correlation analysis for all the European countries by using all the considered variables, but focusing on the differences between low-tech (LTS), medium low-tech (MLTS), medium high-tech (MHTS) and high-tech (HTS) sectors. The correlation matrix for LTS and MLTS highlighted the absence of any significant correlation between FDI sectoral localisation and all the other variables. In the MHTS industries, significant and positive correlations were evident between FDI and R&D expenditure intensity on the one hand; between FDI and CVT on the other.
Moreover, both R&D and CVT were also positively correlated with patents and productivity levels.
It seems that in this context a complementarity holds between R&D and vocational training, with some positive effects on the innovative activities. In particular, FDI seem to play the role of supporting this complementarity. The results of the correlation matrix for high-tech industries (HTS) depict a sort of dichotomy between the significant and positive correlation between FDI and specialisation level, and the usual positive relationships among R&D, vocational training, patents and productivity levels. So, in this context, innovative activities do rely on FDI, but seem to be implemented by the internal efforts, of both R&D and training.
The correlation results for the European countries highlighted the different and complex relationships (role of FDI, complementarity or substitution between innovative inputs, etc.) within the four technological intensity manufacturing macro-sectors, but did not allow the existence of some groups of countries with similar characteristics for the considered variables to be investigated.
In section 4, based on a multivariate statistical technique (cluster analysis), we discussed the position of the CEE countries within the more general framework of the whole European area and provided evidence of the existence / non-existence of situations and conditions that support the interpretative framework discussed in section 2.
In particular, in the LTS, all the CEE countries are grouped in the same cluster characterised by above-average levels of FDI, relevant specialisation in low-tech sectors and relatively high levels of only intermediate education (higher education is nearly average). These features are accompanied by very low levels of R&D (both sector-and non-sector-specific), lifelong learning and continuous vocational training. Regarding innovative output performance, we observed very low levels of patents and poor productivity performance, while the share of innovative enterprises is close to the average of the European countries. So, in the case of LTS, the significant FDI inflows into the CEE countries seems to be accompanied by a strong presence of contextual rather that formal knowledge, with poor formal innovation production and weak productivity; the former can be, in part, considered a consequence of the specialisation pattern.
The group of the CEE countries was quite similar to the small group made up of Greece and Portugal. Finally, it is interesting to note that all the clusters in the LTS are characterised by high levels of R&D or specialisation. These factors, however, cannot be considered as substitutes (codified vs. tacit knowledge) in the process of innovation production, being the highest levels of these indicators only associated with formalised knowledge inflows.
As for the high-tech sector, the CEE are scattered into three different groups, suggesting that the situation of the CEE countries in the HT sector is less homogeneous than in the LTS.
Furthermore, some CEE countries seem more similar to some western countries. While the three Baltic countries and Bulgaria are indeed set apart from the rest because of the very low levels of both potential innovative input (including FDI) and output, this is not the case for the Czech
Republic that was associated with Germany and Austria in the group where above-average knowledge intensive flows of a different nature seem compatible with the near-average innovative and productivity performance. This group could, to some extent, be considered a soft version of the two punctiform ones of The Netherlands and Ireland, and seems to provide (together with these two other groups) a possible support to the virtuous circle proposed in section 2 as a possible interpretative option. Moreover these results would suggest that the various forms of knowledge creation (stemming from R&D or specialisation patterns) in HT sectors could be complementary inputs, rather than substitutes, in innovative and productivity performance. So, our results suggest that our interpretative framework could be suitable in the HT sectors, but not in the low-tech sectors, where a more distinct, pure localisation strategy of cost minimisation with weaker knowledge spillovers could be hypothesised. Poland and Slovakia were classified in another cluster in which the values of all the variables were remarkably lower than the average performance levels.
The outcomes obtained for the Medium-Low Tech Sector (MLTS) again suggest a clear diversification between the CEE countries and the remaining western countries; however, it is interesting to note that the CEE countries are divided into two separate groups (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in cluster 4; the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria in cluster 1). The two clusters have very similar levels of innovative output but quite different endowments in terms of human capital (a higher level in cluster 4), specialisation and R&D activities (more relevant in cluster 1). The major difference is the capacity to attract FDI. These results seem to confirm those obtained for the LTS: in the lowest technology intensive sectors, in the CEE countries, even when the conditions for innovation and productivity growth are present (including the presence of FDI), they do not necessarily become concrete and evolve into growth potential, but rather remain a simple localisation factor. The fourth cluster analysis, referring to the Medium-High-Tech Sector, grouped the CEE countries in cluster 5, with the significant exception of the Czech Republic, together with some very low performers of Western Europe. Interestingly the Czech Republic was detached from the rest of the CEE countries, due to well above-average levels of foreign capital endowment, specialisation and human capital. These factors, however, are not able to guarantee significantly higher innovative and productive performances with respect to group 5.
In short, these empirical comparative investigations highlighted the existence of notable differences between the European countries and aggregations, even within the CEE countries. The correlation results showed the possible existence of some common relationships at the European (27) level and, finally, the cluster analysis explored the multivariate characteristics of country aggregations distinguished by sectoral technological intensity.
Some results of the empirical analyses confirmed the interpretative framework proposed in section 2. More in-depth investigations are needed in order to more fully consider the "institutional" and "structural" differences and the progress of CEE countries in the transition process.
However, the complex relationships that emerged in the paper as regards the CEE countries (especially, interactions between FDI and innovative inputs, possible complementarities between innovative inputs, relationship between these latter and innovative outputs) are strongly dependent on the consideration of the "technological intensity". This suggests that it is essential to have a high level of coordination between the set of development policies (investments in human capital, R&D and infrastructures; speed and characteristics of the progress in transition; industrial policies and selected incentive and norms for attracting FDI; labour and employment policies; etc.) at the different levels (European, national, regional and local) in order to avoid the long-run trap of a productive specialisation that is totally centred on low-tech, mature sectors. The correlation is signifcant at the 0.01 level (2-tails) **.
APPENDIX
The correlation is signifcant at the 0.05 level (2-tails) *.
Table A8. Correlation Matrix for MLTS
Source: Elaboration on Eurostat data. Legend: FDI = FDI sector/GDP; RS_GDP = R&D expenditure/ GDP; RS_POP = R&D personnel / population; SPEC = sectoral employment / total employment; EDU_DIP = secondary school / population; EDU_LAU = tertiary school / population; LLL = participants to life long learning / population; CVT = participant in continuous vocational training in manufacturing sector / employees in manufacturing sector; LTS IPC = number of patents low tech / population; HTS IPC = number of patents high tech / population; INN _ENT = innovative enterprises / population; PRODUCT = GDP / employment. The correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tails) **.
The correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tails) *.
Table A10. Correlation Matrix for HTS
Source: Elaboration on Eurostat data. Legend: FDI = FDI sector/GDP; RS_GDP = R&D expenditure/ GDP; RS_POP = R&D personnel / population; SPEC = sectoral employment / total employment; EDU_DIP = secondary school / population; EDU_LAU = tertiary school / population; LLL = participants to life long learning / population; CVT = participant in continuous vocational training in manufacturing sector / employees in manufacturing sector; LTS IPC = number of patents low tech / population; HTS IPC = number of patents high tech / population; INN _ENT = innovative enterprises / population; PRODUCT = GDP / employment. 
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